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RESEARCH NOTE
PUBLIC OPINION ON CRIMINAL LAW AND LEGAL SANCTIONS: AN
EXAMINATION OF TWO CONCEPTUAL MODELS*
CHARLES W. THOMAS,"* ROBIN J. CAGE***
Two basic perspectives have been advanced to
explain how criminal laws are created, legitimated,
and applied. I One, the "consensus model," suggests
that criminal law is essentially a codification of the
values of a people that may be viewed as legitimate
because it reflects high levels of agreement on both
what constitutes a criminal offense and the magnitude of formal legal sanctions that may be imposed
on those who violate the law. Further, the application of criminal codes by the state is viewed as proper
by virtue of the assumption that the state exercises its
power in a neutral manner; this allows conflicts of
interest to be resolved without the normative foundations of the system being challenged.
An alternative perspective, the "conflict model,"
places far greater emphasis on the political process
by means of which criminal laws are drafted,
enacted, interpreted and enforced. This is a process
that is viewed as being grounded in the on-going
struggle between vested interest groups which seek to
have their particular values legitimated and supported by the coercive power of the state. Thus, the
conflict model asserts that criminal law is an oppressive entity because it supports the values of the
powerful to the detriment and, not infrequently, the
criminalization of those without power. A basic
* This is a revision of a paper presented to the American
Society of Criminology Convention, November 4, 1974, in
Chicago, Illinois. The research was supported by the
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal
Justice of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration,
grant 73-NI-03-0002. This financial support from NILECJ
does not, however, indicate the concurrence of the Institute
in any of the statements or conclusions in this paper.
** Department of Sociology, Bowling Green State University.
***Department of Sociology, Bowling Green State
University.
+ Department of Sociology, Old Dominion University.
'Cf W. CHAMBLISS & R. SEIDMAN, LAW, ORDER, AND
POWER 16-74 (1974); C. HARTJEN, CRIME AND CRIMINALIZATION 16-39 (1974); R. QUINNEY, THE SOCIAL REALITY
OF CRIME 29-100 (1970); E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY,
CRIMINOLOGY 8-12 (9th ed. 1974).
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distinction between these two positions has been
aptly noted by Chambliss and Seidman:
The one assumes that at the bottom there is a
fundamental value-consensus in society which is reflected in the law-making, law-applying, and adjudicating machinery of the State. The other proposes
that control of the State and its awesome machinery of
compulsion is itself the prize for which antagonistic
interests struggle. 2
The importance of these two paradigms would
lead one to expect numerous empirical assessments of
their viability, but this is not the case. True, several
studies have examined the influence of special interest groups on the formulation of legislation on such
topics as sex offenses, ' theft, antitrust legislation, '
drug offenses, 6 prohibition," vagrancy, 8 prostitution,' and "blue laws."" Other analyses have focused on the congruity between public opinion,
statutory provisions, and the application of criminal
law. 1" Still, the importance of these studies notwithstanding, they have not provided answers to ques'W. CHAMBLISS & R.

SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 17.
'Sutherland, The Sexual Psychopath Laws, 40J. CRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 543 (1950); Sutherland, The Diffusion of
Sexual Psychopath Laws, 56 AM. J. SOcIOLoGY 142
(1950).
'J. HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY (1952).
'See generally H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST

POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AMERICAN TRADITION (1955).
6H. S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS 137-46 (1963); LINDE-

SMITH, Federal Law
PROBLEMS 48 (1959).

and Drug Addiction, 7 SOCIAL
Cf T. DUSTER, THE LEGISLATION

OF MORALITY (1970).
'J. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE

(1963).
'Chambliss, A Sociological Analysis of the Law of
Vagrancy, 12 SOCIAL PROBLE.ts 67 (1964).
'An excellent treatment of this topic is found in Roby,
Politics and Criminal Law: Revision of New York State
Penal Law on Prostitution, 17 SOCIAL PROBLESIS 83
(1969).
'OR. QUINNEY, supra note 1.
"There are a number of stimulating articles in this area.
See, e.g., Boydell & Grindstaff, Public Opinion Toward
Legal Sanctions of Crimes of Violence, 65 J. CRIm . L.C. &
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tions about whether public evaluations of appropriate legal sanctions reflect the level of agreement
implied by the consensus model, or the dissension
predicted by the conflict model.
Despite the absense of adequate research, it seems
clear that the consensus paradigm implies that public
opinion will consistently support the prohibition of
some types of behavior and that there will be
considerable agreement on the level of sanctions that
are appropriate for those who engage in these types
of behavior. The conflict model, on the other hand,
appears to predict that consensus does not exist and
that, to the contrary, different social groupings
subscribe to quite different evaluations of what
constitutes a criminal act and what types of sanctions
are appropriate for violators. The purpose of this
research is to evaluate which of the two perspectives
provides the best predictions of how private citizens,
evaluate the relative seriousness of a variety of acts
and what types of sanctions they feel are appropriate

for those who engage in these types of behavior.
Simply put, if there is consensus on these two dimensions across social groupings, a basic expectation of
the consensus model would be supported; if there is
a marked lack of agreement, the implications of the
conflict model would be supported.

P.S. 113 (1974), which studied public attitudes toward the
severity of the penalty to be imposed for several categories of
offenses. The extent to which the general public is ignorant
of the details of criminal procedure-as opposed to the
dramatic aspects of law enforcement-was highlighted by
analyzing interview responses of a few hundred laymen.
Gibbons, Who Knows What About Correction, 9 CRIME &

A sizeable number of households that were initially
selected could not be reached at the addrisses we
obtained from our directories because they, had
moved out of the area, were seriously ill, had died or
because of other reasons. These cases were deleted

DELINQUENCY

137 (1963). Another researcher examined

the tendency of individuals to approve or at least be
indifferent toward "chiseling" on unemployment compensation, finding it to be greater as the individual becomes
nearer to the situation. Smigel, Public Attitudes Toward
'Chiseling' with Reference to Unemployment Compensation, 18 AMf. SocIoLOOCAL REV. 59 (1953). The permissiveness of public attitudes toward cheating on unemployment compensation seems to carry over into the area of
gambling. Interviews of 180 persons in a medium-size city
in the eastern United States lend credence to the conclusion
that public attitudes toward gambling are much more permissive than the statutes which are common in the United
States. Gardiner, Public Attitudes toward Gambling and
Corruption, 374 ANNALS 123 (1967). See also Boydell &
Grindstaff, PublicAttitude toward Legal Sanctions: A Pilot

Study,

in SOCIAL PROCESS AND INSTITUTION: THE CAGallagher & D. Lambert eds.
NADIAN CASE 306

(J.

1971); Parker, Juvenile Court Actions and Public Response, in BEcOMING DELINQUENT 252 (P. Garabedian &
D. Gibbons eds. 1970); Boydell & Grindstaff, Public Attitudes and Court Dispositions:A ComparativeAnalysis, 58
SOCIOLOGY & SOCIAL RES. 417 (1974); Gibbons, Crime and
Punishment: A Study in Social Attitudes, 47 SOCIAL
FORCES 391 (1969); Makela, Public Sense of Justice and
Judicial Practice, 10 AcTA Soc. 42 (1966); Newman,
Public Attitudes Toward a Form of White Collar Crime, 4

228 (1957); Rooney & Gibbons, Social
Reactions to Crimes Without Victims, 13 SOCIAL PROBSOCIAL PROBLEMS

400 (1966); Rose & Prell, Does the PunishmentFit
the Crime?, 61 Alt. J. SoCIoLOGY 247 (1955); Smigel,
Public Attitudes Toward Stealing as Related to Size of
Victim Organization, 21 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 320
(1956).
LEMS

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The data required to address these issues were
collected in 1973 during the course of a larger project
that was conducted in a southeastern Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Area which had a population of over 680,000. A brief letter in which the
general purpose of the study was described was
mailed to a systematic random sample of 9,178
households drawn from telephone listings late in
1973.12 Shortly thereafter each household received a
rather lengthy questionnaire. Those who did not
respond promptly received a reminder letter and, if
they still failed to respond, a second questionnaire. 13

"A number between one and eighteen was selected at
random. From that starting point every eighteenth residence listing in the directory was chosen -.or inclusion in the
sample. All business listings were omitted from the study.
As has been frequently noted in methodological literature
(cf Fletcher & Thompson, Telephone Directory Samples
and Random Telephone Number Generation, 18 J.
BROADCASTING

178 (1974); Leuthold & Scheele, Patterns

of Bias in Samples Based on Telephone Directories, 35
PUB. OPIN. Q. 249 (1971); Roslow & Roslow, Unlisted
Phone SubscribersAre Different, 12 J. ADVERTISING RES.

35 (1972)), the use of telephone directories may introduce
systematic bias into the sample given the fact that all homes
do not have phones, directories quickly become dated, some
residents have unlisted numbers, newly arrived residents
may be excluded, and so on. On the other hand, we could
locate no alternative listings which were not even more
inaccurate.
"The use of mailed questionnaires raises a substantial
number of methodological issues regarding such considerations as whether addresses and cover letters should be
personalized, type of postage (business return rather than
stamped or metered return envelopes), number and type of
follow-ups and so on. For examinations of many of the
issues as well as reviews of previous research see Carpenter,
PersonalizingMail Surveys: A Replication and Reassessment, 38 PUB. OPIN. Q. 614 (1974); Etzel & Walker,
Effects of Alternative Follow-Up Procedures on Mail
Survey Response Rates, 59 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 219

(1974); Veiga, Getting the Mail QuestionnaireReturned:
Some Practical Research Considerations, 59 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOLOGY 217 (1974). Our technique follows the sug-

gestions contained in evaluational studies to the extent
possible, given the pressure of time and our large sample.

[Vol. 67

THOMAS, CAGE AND FOSTER
from the sample. Of the several reasons that can be
offered for this sample shrinkage, migration out of
the area was by far the most frequently encountered.
This problem was anticipated given the heavy
concentration of military personnel who reside in the
area.
Of the 7,229 households which we were able to
contact, properly completed questionnaires were
returned by 46.1 per cent (N = 3,334). 14A comparison of the social and demographic characteristics of
our sample with the statistical information provided
in the 1970 census report on this SMSA shows that
those who were older, white, well-educated, higher
in occupational prestige and relatively affluent were
more likely to return completed questionnaires than
were others in the population. This selectivity in
our returns is at least partially balanced by the fact
that these variables are held constant in the analysis
which follows.
Information on public attitudes toward a variety of
offenses was obtained in the following manner. First,
the respondents were asked to consider what they felt
would be "a fair sentence" for each of seventeen
offenses. The only additional information they were
given was that the hypothetical individual was (1)
guilty, (2) an adult and (3) a first offender. Possible
sentencing alternatives that were provided included
"no punishment or a minor fine," "probation," "less
than a year in jail," an exact sentence in years, "life
imprisonment," and "the death penalty." No sentence, or a minor fine and probation were assigned a
numeric value of zero years; less than a year in jail
was defined as .5 years; and sentences of more than
forty-five years, life imprisonment, and death were
assigned a value of forty-five years. Exact sentences
of between one year and forty-five years were not
altered. The net effect of this treatment of the data
was to deflate artificially the estimates of sentence
lengths, particularly in the case of serious crimes
against person for which life imprisonment or the
death penalty were frequently favored. Because our
analysis focuses on relative sentence lengths rather
than their absolute value, this is not a significant
limitation of the study.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

We were able to obtain a considerable volume of
data on the social background characteristics of those
14Given the frequency of 10 to 30 per cent return rates
that are noted in the literature (cf. H. BOYD & R.
WESTFALL,

MARKETING

RESEARCH

(3d ed. 1972); D.

H. WALES, & D. TAYLOR, MARKETING RESEARCH
(3d ed. 1970)) and the rather lengthy questionnaire
employed in the present study, this return rate appears
quite acceptable.
LUCK,

in our sample as well as an expression of their
minimum, average, and maximum sentence preferences for each of the seventeen types of offenses under
consideration. Limitations of space clearly preclude
the presentation of more than a portion of our
findings in this brief report. The basic objective of
our analysis, however, is fairly specific. Initially, we
wished to identify any variations in perception of the
relative seriousness of the set of offenses as we moved
from one cohort of our sample to another. The
consensus model implies that such rank-orderings
will be quite similar; the conflict model posits
considerable variation. Further, it is important that
we determine the extent of variation in the severity of
sanctions which various social categories view as
appropriate. Again, the consensus model implies
agreement on levels of sanctions that are viewed as
proper; the conflict model implies considerable variance in sentence lengths, particularly variance of a
class-based nature.
In order to examine potential differences in the
rank-ordering of offenses, we ranked the perceived
seriousness of seventeen types of behavior from most
to least serious on the basis of the mean sentence
length assigned to each type of behavior by each
cohort in the sample. The race and sex dichotomies
are self-explanatory; the age, education, income, and
occupational prestige variables were dichotomized at
the median of their respective distributions. (The
occupational prestige variable was measured by
assigning weights to self-reported occupations on the
basis of Hodge-Siegel-Rossi Prestige Scores.) The
rankings of the seventeen offenses which we obtained are reported in Table I.
The agreement between each component of the six
dichotomized social background and demographic
characteristics was determined by computing Spearman's rho coefficients for each of the six pairs of
ranks. This information was supplemented by computing rank-order correlations between each of the
twelve orderings of the offenses and the general
rankings obtained from the overall mean sentences
assigned to each of the offenses by the total sample.
Both sets of correlations are reported in Table I.
As can readily be seen from an examination of
these coefficients, the consistency of the rankings is
quite high. The lowest correlation we obtained, for
example, was the .917 coefficient yielded by a
comparison of the rankings of our black and white
respondents. The average correlation" was .977 for
the six social background variables and .989 for the
twelve comparisons involving the social background
15

See J.

MUELLER,

K.

SCHUESSLER

STATISTICAL REASONING IN SOCIOLOGY

& H.

COSTNER,

267-78 (1970).
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characteristics and the total sample ranking. All
thirteen rankings consistently show that crimes
against person are perceived to be quite serious and
that victimless crimes are viewed as relatively minor
offenses.
These findings raise serious questions with regard
to the empirical adequacy of the conflict model. Were
the conflict interpretation valid, we would expect
pronounced differences in the rankings assigned to
these offenses, particularly when the seriousness
rankings of those from lower socioeconomic strata
are compared with those from higher socioeconomic
brackets. This expectation finds virtually no support.
This is illustrated by the remarkable similarity in
offense rankings for those from above and below the
median sample income (r = .998), the median
occupational prestige level (r = .998), and the
median educational level (r = .973). On the other
hand, the consensus model, although presently under
considerable attack from a variety of quarters,
predicts exactly what we found in our analysis: a
very high level of agreement on the relative seriousness of a variety of crimes against person, crimes
against property, and victimless crimes. Thus, we
conclude that the consensus model provides more
accurate predictions of perceptions of the seriousness
of this set of offenses than does the conflict model.
Similarities in how the several cohorts in our
sample perceive the seriousness of the seventeen
offenses is certainly not conclusive evidence. While
the high correlations noted between the several sets of
rankings may be a necessary condition for agreement
on the exact magnitude of the sanctions which these
social groupings feel are appropriate, it is certainly
not sufficient to substantiate our tentative conclusion.
Indeed, it is equally important to compare the actual
sentence lengths that were assigned to each of the
offenses by the twelve subgroups being considered.
The mean average sentence lengths for each category
of the sample as well as the overall means for the
total sample are reported in Table 11.
As might be anticipated from the high level of
agreement between the rankings reported in Table I,
there is a very high degree of agreement on the
lengths of sentences assigned to the set of possible
offenses. Despite the findings discussed earlier, this
consistency is surprising for at least two reasons.
First, evaluated purely in terms of the relative
plausibility of the consensus and conflict models, we
find the basic perspective provided by the conflict
orientation quite appealing. This led us to expect a
far greater number of significant differences in
sentencing patterns between the several sub-groups
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in our sample than those which are reported in
Tables I and II. Second, because few citizens have
access to or knowledge of either judicial sentencing
patterns or the statutory provisions of criminal law,
we would certainly not have anticipated the uniform
pattern of sentence lengths which are obvious when
one examines any of the seventeen row entries in
Table II. Nevertheless, of 102 separate comparisons
which were made on average sentence lengths (seventeen offenses X six dichotomized social and demographic characteristics), only twenty-eight reveal
mean differences which are significant at a level
equal to or less than the .05 significance level, and in
only one case (the variation in sentences assigned for
murder by our black and white respondents) is the
actual magnitude of the difference greater than five
years. " Indeed, when the absolute values of the
sentence lengths of the twenty-eight significantly
different pairs are averaged, the mean variation is
only 2.15 years.
Apart from the fact that the number and magnitude of differences in average sentences is far less
than what might be implied by some advocates of the
conflict perspective, it is instructive to note which
variables yield a substantial proportion of the differences that were observed, and the pattern into which
these discrepancies fall. The several social and
demographic characteristics, for example, do not
appear to be equally important. When evaluated in
terms of the number of offenses for which mean
sentence lengths were significantly different, educational attainment was the most discriminating variable (accounting for nine of the twenty-eight statistically different sentence assignments) followed by race
(seven of the differences), sex (four differences),
income and occupational prestige (three differences
on each variable), and age (two differences). Where
there were significant differences, the data presented
in Table II show that those with greater than median
levels of educational attainment, occupational prestige, and income, and males were consistently less
severe in their choice of an appropriate sentence than
were those with whom they were compared. Older
respondents were typically more harsh in their
sentencing than were their younger counterparts.
Finally, we observed only one group in which the
16
We are well aware of the statistical problems described
by Selvin, A Critique of Tests of Significance in Survey Research, 22 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REv. 519 (1957) and others
with regard to computing such a large number of "t" tests,
but this difficulty implies that there may be an even smaller

number of true significant differences than what we have
noted. Were this to be the case, the relative degree of
support would be even stronger.
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observed differences were in inconsistent directions;
the black respondents were more lenient in the
sentences they assigned for homicide, rape, and the
sale of drugs to minors, but they were more severe in
the sanctions they felt appropriate for possession of
marijuana, gambling, and prostitution.
DIscussioN
Particularly in recent years, many criminologists
have argued that the heavy emphasis on a consensually validated normative system in some criminological theory is inapplicable to the situation that is
typically confronted in contemporary urbanized and
industrialized nations. Instead, they have convincingly argued for more dynamic and processual
models that focus on conflict, competition, and the
exercise of power. Unfortunately, advocates of both
consensus and conflict theory have often fallen victim
to the temptation to support their positions with
arguments based more on speculation and isolated
examples than on systematic empirical research.
Indeed, their respective assumptions of pervasive
consensus and conflict are far too frequently treated
as self-evident facts that require no empirical verification.
Our analysis has focused attention on a variety of
types of offenses. Some, like homicide, or rape, are
obviously examples of criminal acts that do not
adequately reflect the central concerns of many
conflict theorists; but the same cannot be said of
many other types of behavior, such as public officials
taking a bribe, tax fraud, and the several victimless
offenses. Our findings, regardless of the type or
category of offense examined, are not supportive of
any prediction that suggests variations between
different categories of the population in either perceptions of relative seriousness of these offenses, or
the level of sanctions that are viewed as appropriate.
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Instead, we find evidence of a remarkable level of
consensus, even after separating the sample on the
basis of their sex, race, age, income, occupational
prestige, and educational attainment.
As with any study in which highly polarized
positions are directly compared with one another, we
fully expect our findings to be subjected to unusually
careful scrutiny and, quite probably, more than a few
direct attacks. We will only attempt to comment on
the specious logic inherent in the most obvious
criticism. Specifically, there are many who feel that
cross-sectional survey data provide a wholly inappropriate means of testing the implications of a conflict
model which, particularly in its more Marxian
forms, emphasizes the historical evolution of a form
of political domination that now includes the political
socialization of people at all levels of the stratification
system. Among other things, scholars of this persuasion argue that we have demonstrated the validity of
the conflict perspective rather than identifying a basic
weakness. The premise would be that we have only
measured the consequences of political socialization,
or a "false consciousness."
We can respond to this quite simply. First, how a
system emerges and how it is perpetuated do not
necessarily call for a reliance on comparable explanatory models or variables. Whatever the "causes"
may be for the consensus that we have identified, it
clearly exists; and because it does, interpretations
for the manner in which it may be transmitted from
one generation to another may call for different conceptual tools than those required to account for its
emergence. Second, the notion of a "false consciousness" is, practically speaking, tautological: had we
detected class-based differences, they would have
been accepted as support for a conflict interpretation; the fact that no such differences were found
cannot, therefore, also be interpreted as supportive.

